The court assured Mastronardi that, prior to trial, he would be able to share the information with the defendant to prepare his defense. At the hearing on that motion, heldon October 6,1998, the trialcourt, Ronan, J., provided Mastronardi with two alternatives: (1) the court would order disclosure of the names and addresses of the state’s witnesses to Mastronardi, but would prohibit him from disclosing that information to the defendant or (2) the court would grant the defendant’s discovery motion with the names and addresses redacted. ‘‘Following the consolidation of the two cases, on August11,1998,thestatefiledamotionforaprotective order to preclude disclosure to the defense of the identity of certain witnesses, including the two minor victims, Brown and Tyree Snead. Mastronardi, whofiled hisappearance onJuly 23,1998, The defendant was represented initially by Frank Riccio in connection with the first case and, thereafter, by. In the second case, thestateallegedthatonMay29,1998,whilehewasfree onbondfollowinghisarrestforthedrive-byshootingin the first case, the defendant, who had covered his face to conceal his identity, murdered Snead at the Boston Avenue Barbershop in Bridgeport. All three of the victims were identified by name inthe police arrest warrant affidavit dated September 11, 1997, and in the second substitute information filed January 20, 1998. ‘‘In the first case, the state alleged that, on September 2, 1997, in the vicinity of 500 Lindley Street in Bridgeport, the defendant had attempted to murder Rudolph Snead, Jr., his partner in a crack cocaine operation, by shooting at while in his car, and that the defendant thereby had committed risk of injury to the two minor children, Leroy Brown, Jr., and Tyree Snead, both seven years of age, who were in the backseat of Snead’s car during the shooting. The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history regarding the two consolidated cases underlying the present appeal. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed toeffectuatetheremedyorderedbythiscourtinPeelerI fortheimproperdisqualificationofhischosenattorney, Gary Mastronardi, when it denied his motion to require thestatetopayMastronardi’sprivatefeerates,because he had become indigent and Mastronardi would not representhimatthenewtrialattheratepaidtoassigned counsel by the Division of Public Defender Services (division).2 Wedisagree and, accordingly, weaffirm the judgment of the trial court. to 1997) § 53-21 (1), and murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54a (a), two counts of risk ofinjurytoachildinviolationofGeneralStatutes(Rev. 2d 710 (2004) (Peeler I), convicting him of attempted murder inviolationofGeneralStatutes§ 53a-49(a)andGeneral Statutes (Rev. The defendant, Russell Peeler, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court in two consolidated cases, rendered after a jury trial conductedonremandfromthiscourt’sdecisioninState v. 2d 409 (2006), as the remedy for the violation of his right to counsel of choice under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, when that defendant has become indigent and cannot afford to retain that attorney’s services for the new trial. Smriga, Joseph Corradinoĭescription: This appeal requires us to consider the extent to which a criminal defendant is entitled to representation by a particular attorney at a new trial ordered in accordance with United States v. Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to support the publication of case reports on MoreLawĬase Style: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
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